Bangladesh in the Crosshair of Big Powers Contestation
• Dr. Vijay Sakhuja
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has accused the US of interference in the domestic affairs of Bangladesh. She also alleged Washington’s role in her ouster from the country: “I could have remained in power if I had left St Martin’s and the Bay of Bengal to America”. The US has dismissed the insinuations as “simply false,” and through a press briefing, the White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre clarified, “We believe that the Bangladeshi people should determine the future of the Bangladeshi government and that's where we stand.” This is not the first time that St. Martin Island has figured in the US-Bangladesh relationship discourse; in fact, in 2023, Hasina declared that Bangladesh’s sovereignty is paramount and “I don't want to return to power by leasing out St Martin’s Island.”
St. Martin Island, also known as “Narikel Zinzira” or the “Coconut Island,” is a coral reef feature measuring just 3 square kilometers with about 3,800 residents, the majority being fishermen. It is strategically located nine kilometers south of the tip of the Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula, in the northern Bay of Bengal.
Northern Bay of Bengal waters have been quite calm, and India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar have maintained good relations. These countries successfully navigated the overlapping maritime territorial disputes through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (Bangladesh vs Myanmar, 2012) and arbitration (Bangladesh vs India, 2014) under the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS. However, there have been strategic tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the Rohingya migrant issue since 2017.
Along with the other littorals of the Bay of Bengal, i.e., Thailand and Sri Lanka, these countries have invested politico-diplomatic-strategic capital in addressing non-traditional security threats such as piracy, drug running, illegal migration, and challenges arising from climate change, natural disasters, ocean acidification, etc. In fact, the regional grouping, BIMSTEC, has been facilitating the process of state-led regionalism. However, there have been undercurrents of geopolitical contestations in the Bay of Bengal.
China is perhaps the leader in the pack with geopolitical ambitions in the Bay of Bengal. It has undertaken strategic asset building in the region under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through funds, technology, and technical expertise. In Bangladesh, during the last 10 years, China has initiated 35 projects (roads, rail, port, airport, expressway, water, coal, and solar energy projects, etc.) valued at US$ 4.45 billion. It has also supported military modernization and capacity building of Myanmar and Bangladesh, including the supply of submarines to Thailand and Bangladesh (two vessels). In the case of the latter, there are reports that a submarine base—BNS Sheikh Hasina—is being built with Chinese assistance at Pekua in Cox’s Bazar.
Russia, too, has been making a beeline for Myanmar and Bangladesh. In 2023, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) assisted Myanmar to open its first-ever nuclear technology information center in Yangon, and in June 2024, it was announced that the Russian government had approved a draft agreement to build a plant with a capacity of at least 110 megawatts using Russian pressurized water reactors. Russian warships have made port calls in Myanmar, and the first-ever Russia-Myanmar naval exercise (MARUMEX) was held in the Andaman Sea in November 2023.
Interestingly, Russia, which was earlier a supplier of arms to Myanmar, has been sourcing weapons from Myanmar to support its war effort against Ukraine. For instance, Russian technicians are reported to be assisting in the manufacture of 120 mm mortar rounds in Myanmar, and these are being sold to Russia. At another level, Russian arms sales to Myanmar (38%) exceed that of China (26%) and India (18%).
Bangladesh, too, has received civilian nuclear technology from Russia under a US$ 11.38 billion loan. The Rooppur 1 nuclear power plant is behind schedule due to the Covid pandemic, and US sanctions on Russia prompted Bangladesh to make payments in Yuan. China is the largest supplier of military hardware to Bangladesh (72%), followed by Russia (12%) and 16% from the rest of the world. Russia is the primary supplier for the Bangladesh Air Force with Mig-29 and SU-30. Russian warships, too, have visited the Chittagong Port in 2023.
The US has attempted to make strategic inroads into Bangladesh. The bilateral defense cooperation discussions have focused on the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) for intelligence sharing and the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for logistic support, supplies, and services; however, “Bangladesh is hesitant to agree to these proposed bilateral agreements.”
Bangladesh, under the new political dispensation, will have to navigate the complexities of great power engagements with immense dexterity. The ties with its immediate neighbors will be extremely important to reverse the adverse impact on regional security.
Just before Sheikh Hasina fled her country in August 2024, in June the ‘India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future’ document stated: “… we will explore defense industrial cooperation for the modernization of the Armed Forces of Bangladesh, to strengthen their capability for defense” including “multifaceted military engagements of exercises, training, and capability development.” This will need to be followed up by the new government in Dhaka.
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru.
