INSTC Popularity Gathers Momentum in South Asia
• Dr. Vijay Sakhuja
Two South Asian countries are clamoring to connect up with the International North-South Transport corridor (INSTC). First, Pakistan’s Ambassador in Moscow has stated that President Putin, in his 2022 address to the nation had extended invitation to his country to join the INSTC, and Islamabad “has begun the process of accession”. Also, Pakistan is keen on a steady supply of energy resources from Russia and had so far successfully imported 1 million tons of Russian crude oil. Furthermore, Pakistan and Russia have entered into cooperation in the agriculture sector and the first shipment of Pakistani citrus fruits arrived in Dagestan though a section of the INSTC via Iran and Azerbaijan. Interestingly, Pakistan has also sought Moscow’s help to join the BRICS and appears to be encouraged by the earlier Russian support to join the SCO.
Second, Afghanistan sees potential of the INSTC to help build its economy. In 2016, under a tripartite agreement, India and Iran had agreed to help Afghanistan to use the Chabahar port (an important node in the INSTC connectivity network as also a transit hub for Afghanistan to bypass Pakistan) and engage in international trade. More recently, in May 2024, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan announced plans to set up a logistics center in Herat province in western Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s Minister of Trade Nuruddin Azizi is optimistic of the strategic importance of the Herat facility and expects Russia to transport energy resources to his country and other South Asian countries, particularly Pakistan. According to a statement the “creation of the hub [Herat] will allow for the development of multi-modal services by consolidating truck shipments in the dry port where they will be sorted and sent along railroads on the North-South corridor to sea ports in the Gulf, Pakistan, and Indian Ocean, towards India," Also, Kazakhstan is exploring to use Herat to export goods into South Asian markets.
Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are embroiled in domestic political turbulence and insecurity which precludes countries to invest in infrastructure in these countries. A case in point is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which has been under threat due to attacks on Chinese officials and technicians working on the projects. These have adversely impacted project continuity and caused unwarranted delays. China has repeatedly sought security assurances from Pakistan’s military and internal security establishment for its nationals but the attacks continue.
At the most recent Pakistan-China Joint Consultative Mechanism meeting, the third such iteration, which included representatives from all major Pakistani political parties, the Chinese head of the delegation, Liu Jianchao, who is serving as the Minister of Central Committee of the International Department of Communist Party of China, warned that “security threats are the main hazards to CPEC cooperation” and that the “primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation,” In particular, the Chinese insurance company Sinosure which provides cover for new projects is reluctant to offer its services. China is also concerned about domestic political instability and Liu Jianchao did not hesitate to express his country’s concerns saying, “Only when all political parties in a country join hands to ensure political and social stability can there be sustainable development.”
A similar situation prevails in Afghanistan and is further compounded by weak economic situation resulting in widespread poverty. The Taliban is seeking investments for development of infrastructure but must contend with low economic growth and sanctions against the Taliban by the West. The US had frozen US$ 7 billion (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) assets in August 2021 when the Afghan government collapsed, and the EU has only offered humanitarian aid and provided food, shelter, and health services. China’s diplomatic (first country to appoint a new ambassador to Kabul) and economic-commercial (minerals development-copper, lithium, rare earths; Amu Basin oil extraction, and a 300 kilometer long road to link Badakhshan to the Chinese border) inroads in Afghanistan are notable. However the Chinese are concerned about the presence of Uyghur militants in the China-Afghanistan border regions; apparently the Taliban have “assured China that they will prevent Afghan soil from being used for terrorist attacks against its neighbours,".
While India would be sanguine to the idea of Herat linking up with Chabahar, a legacy of the 2016 trilateral agreement between Afghanistan, India and Iran, it remains concerned about Pakistan for at least two counts. First, there is past history about Pakistan derailing the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) gas pipeline to transport gas from Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan and then to India. Second, the Iran Pakistan India (IPI) pipeline or the Peace Pipeline was shelved while in the initial stages by India due to a number of “missteps by Pakistan including the Kargil War, the attack on Indian parliament and the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai” and precluded Indian interest in the project. India, on its part is unlikely to encourage Pakistan’s desire to plug into the INSTC and may even put pressure on Russia over its offer to Pakistan to join the INSTC.
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru.
